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Abstract
The European Semester became an essential part of the revised governance architecture of the Europe 2020 reform strat‐
egy for the Single European Market under the conditions of the global financial crisis and the emerging eurozone crisis
a decade ago. The article examines to what extent the European Semester offers channels to establish throughput legiti‐
macy by granting national parliaments the ability to effectively scrutinise executive decision‐making in the annual policy
cycle. Poland is chosen as the case study for parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s system of multi‐level governance in the
East‐Central European region. The analysis adopts a liberal intergovernmentalist two‐level approach. On the domestic
level it concentrates on the involvement of the Sejm, the lower house of parliament, on the drafting of the Polish National
Reform Plans for the annual Semester policy cycle between 2015 and 2020. The basis for the analysis are official tran‐
scripts from the plenary debates in the relevant committees, the European Affairs Committee and the Public Finance and
the Economic Committee. The Polish case study illustrates that the European Semester represents a predominantly elite‐
driven process of policy coordination, which is strongly geared towards EU‐level executive bargaining processes between
national governments and the European Commission at the expense of domestic parliamentary scrutiny.
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1. Introduction
This article concentrates on Poland as the case study
for parliamentary input legitimacy in the East‐Central
European (ECE) region in relation to the EU‐level
European Semester annual coordinative policy cycle,
which is integrated in the economic and social Europe
2020 reform strategy. The case study is determined not
only by the fact that Poland the largest member state
in the group of the ECE member states. The ECE coun‐
tries not only have a less deep‐seated tradition of par‐
liamentary democracy than their Western neighbours.
They also display tendencies towards backsliding from
post‐communist democratisation and moving towards
semi‐autocratic hybrid regimes or “velvet dictatorships”
(Agh, 2019, p. 176) with weakening levels of parliamen‐
tary input and scrutiny, as well as independent judicial
oversight. It is therefore crucial to particularly monitor
to what extent parliaments in the countries in the region
maintain input and scrutiny in the area of EU‐level policy‐
making. Poland has alsomade an astonishing transforma‐
tion fromeconomic and social laggard towards economic
leader in the region. At the time of accession to the EU
in 2004, Poland was not only lagging behind in terms
of its GDP per capita but with 19.1% of the population
out of work, it also recorded the highest unemployment
rate amongst the 2004 ECE‐8 accession group (Schweiger,
2014a, p. 178). Poland used the conditionality of EU
membership to reform its labour market and improve
its competitiveness, and ultimately decided to stay clear
of joining the eurozone to maintain monetary policy as
a means for economic policy‐making. The combination
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of being closely tied to the German export production
chain inside the Single EuropeanMarket while remaining
outside the eurozone and the prudent utilization of EU
funds to target domestic vulnerabilities assisted Poland
in acquiring the prime position of being the only country
which stayed clear of recession during the global finan‐
cial crisis and the subsequent eurozone sovereign debt
crisis (Drozdowicz‐Biec, 2011; Duszczyk, 2016, p. 253).
The EU presents the European Semester as part of the
implementation of the eurozone’s reformed six pack gov‐
ernance rules in the context of a new complex system
of multi‐level governance. It is nevertheless obvious that
the European Semester has shifted the balance substan‐
tially towards the European Commission in an attempt
to strengthen its mandate as a supervisory and correc‐
tive agent, particularly in the eurozone. The European
Parliament mainly plays a consultative role in the area
of employment policy and is reduced to the role of
a bystander in the European Semester coordination of
national economic and budgetary policies. The European
Semester hence displays a significant deficit in terms of
legislative scrutiny on the EU level. In this respect it fits
into the wider legitimacy problem of the EU. The EU is
generally weak on ensuring the direct participation of
citizens in its policy process. EU policies are mainly legit‐
imised through national elections, where governments
receive the mandate to negotiate EU‐level treaties and
policies on behalf of their citizens. This worked during
the first three decades of the integration process, when
the “permissive consensus” between citizens and gov‐
ernment elites gave the latter the benefit of the doubt
in producing efficient policy output (Chryssochoou, 2009,
p. 30). It has however become increasingly constrained
as the EU’s institutional setting, its policy remit and
the diversity of its membership grew over time. In the
larger EU with its complex system of multi‐level gover‐
nance, where it has become ever more difficult for cit‐
izens to determine the responsibility for EU laws and
policies, there is now the predominance of an obvious
‘dissensus’ under which public trust in political leader‐
ship has declined and scepticism towards national and
EU level institutions, including national parliaments and
the European parliament, has grown (Hooghe & Marks,
2009, p. 5). The latest Eurobarometer poll conducted in
February–March 2021 shows very low levels of trust in
national governments (35%) and parliaments (36%) and
only slightly more in the EU and its institutions (49%;
European Commission, 2021b, p. 9).
National parliaments play a crucial role in ensuring
the legitimacy of the EUpolicy process. They not only pro‐
vide input legitimacy by acting as themain bodies, where
the electoral choice of the sovereign is represented and
where hence a government majority emerges which con‐
stitutes the basis for executive decision‐making. They
also play a crucial role in ensuring throughput legiti‐
macy bymonitoring and influencing legislative processes.
The influence of national parliaments in the legislative
process is consequently a crucial precondition to ensure
efficient policy outcomes. Input legitimacy in the form of
national elections therefore becomes the basis for ensur‐
ing transparent and efficient policy‐making in the EU.
Particularly the EU’s complex system of multi‐level gov‐
ernance requires transparency in order to be consid‐
ered legitimate by the citizens in the member states
against the background of growing public scepticism.
Throughput legitimacy is therefore crucial “for evalu‐
ating the legitimacy of complex processes and proce‐
dures occurring within the ‘black box’ of multi‐level gov‐
ernance, as it processes input demands through gover‐
nance institutions to produce policy outputs” (Schmidt &
Wood, 2019, p. 729). The focus on the procedural qual‐
ity of EU‐level policy processes such as the European
Semester in terms of both accountability and trans‐
parency is hence crucial to legitimise themon the domes‐
tic electoral constituency level. Comparative studies of
the level of scrutiny of EU‐level politics by national parlia‐
ments however display discouraging picture (Auel, 2007;
Cornell & Goldoni, 2017; Jancic, 2017). They have most
of all emphasised that individual national parliaments
lack the means to exercise direct input into the leg‐
islative process on the EU institutional level (Boronska‐
Hryniewiecka, 2013, p. 91). Input into governmental
decision‐making on EU affairs on the domestic level is
hence crucial.
In the Polish case the lower house of parliament,
the Sejm, is the crucial piece in the legitimacy puzzle of
the European Semester as monitoring of EU‐level pol‐
icy procedures such as the European Semester, takes
place in the Sejm at committee stage. Legislative scrutiny
of EU‐level policy‐making in a rather centralised sys‐
tem between the Polish government represented by
the Council of Ministers and the Sejm takes mainly
place in the European Affairs Committee, with additional
involvement of the Public Finance and the Economic
Committee in the case of policy areas which deal with
single European market and eurozone issues, which is
at the heart of the European Semester policy cycle.
Previous analyses of the involvement of the Sejm com‐
mittees in scrutinising EU level policies have pointed
out that the level of parliamentary scrutiny in Poland
is rather weak due to the non‐binding nature of recom‐
mendations made by Sejm committees (Gärtner et al.,
2011, p. 88).
The crucial research questionwhich this article exam‐
ines for the case of Poland is hence to what extent
national parliaments are able to effectively scrutinise
executive decision‐making in the European Semester
process. Effective scrutiny is here defined as a pro‐
cess where subsidiarity is continuously applied and
parliamentary supervision of policy‐making in the EU’s
multi‐level governance system takes place as a process
which ensures not only input legitimacy but most of all
also throughput legitimacy. Following the definition by
Schmidt and Wood this means that the analysis needs
to concentrate both on the level of accountability and
transparency of governance processes and also on their
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openness towards input from civil society (Schmidt &
Wood, 2019, p. 730).
The second section of the article sets out themethod‐
ological approach and theoretical framework which is
based on a liberal intergovernmentalist two‐level per‐
spective and focused on throughput legitimacy. The third
section briefly outlines the scope and themechanisms of
the European Semester in the context of the Europe 2020
Strategy. The main analysis of parliamentary scrutiny of
the European Semester in the context of Poland’s domes‐
tic polity is presented in the fourth section, followed by
a concluding evaluation in the final section.
2. Parliamentary Scrutiny of the European Semester:
A Two‐Level Approach towards Throughput Legitimacy
2.1. Theoretical Framework
The analysis presented here follows the perspec‐
tive of the two‐level approach developed by Andrew
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism, based on
Putnam’s original assumption that states play “two
level games” between the interests of their domes‐
tic constituencies and external negotiations (Putnam,
1988, p. 434). This is significant as it is the basis for
Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalist theory, which
explains policy‐making in the EU as a two‐level game
between the domestic political environment of each
member state, secondly the supranational level of the
Community, where interstate bargaining between mem‐
ber states and EU bodies takes place. On the domes‐
tic level, Moravcsik puts the emphasis on the need for
national governments to develop their strategic pol‐
icy preferences by taking into account the plurality of
national interests. Governments hence consider elec‐
toral responses to their decisions but also take into
account the representation of societal interests through
public consultations with stakeholders. The extent to
which the latter consultations take place inside legisla‐
tive bodies or through other channels depends on the
degree of institutionalised corporatism in each domes‐
tic polity. In polities with high levels of integrated policy
coordination the level of interest group influence on
executive policy decisions is higher than in those where
the emphasis lies on the swift implementation of policy
change. This can be seen by the practical operation of
the varying degrees of corporatism found in the polit‐
ical economies of Nordic social democratic, continen‐
tal conservative‐corporatist and liberal models (Amable,
2003; Esping‐Andersen, 1989). The degree of legislative
involvement also depends on the extent to which gov‐
ernments consider it to beneficial to strengthen their
standing in supranational bargaining processes through
domestic parliamentary mandates.
Most importantly, Moravcsik’s liberal intergovern‐
mentalism considers national preferences to represent
“the objectives of those domestic groupswhich influence
the state apparatus” (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 24). It is hence
crucial to determine to which extent the formation of
national preferences takes place in a domestic policy
cycle between public consultation, legislative scrutiny,
and executive decision‐making. This especially applies to
the European Semester, which represents a to this date
unprecedented experiment in multi‐level policy coordi‐
nation. The European Semester was relatively quickly
established in response to the volatility caused by the
global financial crisis and the subsequent triple banking,
economic and sovereign debt crisis with the aim of instill‐
ing confidence and stability in theway governanceworks
in the EU and particularly in the eurozone (Schweiger,
2016, p. 136).
The European Commission points out that the
European Semester “allows EU countries to discuss their
economic and budget plans andmonitor progress at spe‐
cific times throughout the year” (European Commission,
2021a). Liberal intergovernmentalism emphasises the
fact that national governments benefit from being able
to maintain the national preferences on the second level
of bargaining with othermember state governments and
EU‐level institutions, mostly in terms of their electoral
standing (Moravcsik, 1993, pp. 483, 515). One would
therefore assume that governments want to ensure that
the national preferences they introduce on the supra‐
national level of bargaining represent the plurality of
domestic societal interests and that at the same time the
bargaining process runs smoothly without major disrup‐
tions and delays. These assumptions point towards the
need for national governments to effectively coordinate
their policy agenda with domestic veto players to ensure
that the national preferences reflect a relatively broad
national policy consensus. It is obvious that governments
in a parliamentary democracy have to consider both the
formal institutional veto players (amongst them, national
parliaments) who act as agents to prevent change and
the partisan veto players (e.g., political parties) inside
these institutions who can tilt the balance of political
decisions (Tsebelis, 1995, p. 302). Especially concern‐
ing European policy‐making however, governments are
today confronted with growing Eurosceptic sentiments
amongst the electorate who questions EU‐level policies
both in terms of democratic legitimacy and output effi‐
ciency. This results in what Schmidt describes as populist
politics, which is directed both against policy issues (poli‐
tics against policy) and the EU as a polity (politics against
polity). The latter ultimately poses the risk of resulting
in the gradual disintegration of the EU with Brexit being
potentially the first step in a wider disintegrative ten‐
dency (Schmidt, 2020, p. 107).
2.2. Methods and Data Analysed
The two‐level perspective adopted in this case study
concentrates on the examination of the priorities deter‐
mined in the Polish National Reform Plans in the
European Semester policy cycle during the period from
2015 until 2020 and how these have been reflected in
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domestic parliamentary debates in the lower house of
the Sejm at committee stage. For the latter purpose,
transcript from the parliamentary committee meetings
in the Sejm which deal with EU issues were consid‐
ered. The analysis also considers internal parliamentary
dynamics such as the influence of populist parties.
3. The Europe 2020 Strategy and the European
Semester
For almost two decades now the European Union has
been trying to implement an effective strategy against
the persistent growth, employment, and competitive‐
ness problem in many member states. The first attempt
to coordinate national economic, employment and wel‐
fare policies was made in 2000, when the EU initi‐
ated the Lisbon Strategy with the target‐based open
method of coordinationmechanism. The Lisbon Strategy
was supposed to improve the performance of member
states in the areas of growth and employment over
the next decade by setting overall targets and encour‐
aging national governments to engage in policy learn‐
ing from the strategies implemented by the best per‐
forming member states. At the mid‐term review in 2004
under the newly appointed Barroso Commission things
looked bleak. The high‐level group of experts under the
leadership of Wim Kok, commissioned by Commission
President Barroso to assess the performance of mem‐
ber states towards the Lisbon targets, essentially pointed
out the lack of commitment and performance of many
member states in the Lisbon process. The Kok report
hence askedmember states to step up their commitment
towards the performance targets if they did not want
to risk undermining “the sustainability of the society
Europe has built” (European Commission, 2004, p. 16).
At the time of the Lisbon revision the Commission
could certainly not anticipate the events that would
unfold. They were of course completely unaware that
during the next five years European economies would be
hit by the effects of a sub‐prime loan crisis in the financial
industry in the United States. The resulting global finan‐
cial crisis not only pushed back the performance of those
countries that had already been amongst the worst per‐
formers in the EU; it also weakened particularly those lib‐
eral market economies with a strong dependence on the
financial services industry, which before the crisis had
been promoted as rolemodels for competitiveness, stim‐
ulating growth and job creation (European Commission,
2004, p. 10). The triple impact of an economic, bank‐
ing, and sovereign debt crisis in many EU member states
represented a fundamental setback to the ambition of
the Lisbon Strategy to turn the Single European Market
into themost dynamic and competitive economic area in
the world.
The EU responded to this reality by developing a
new and more sophisticated reform strategy, which
was supposed to draw the lessons from the flaws of
Lisbon. The Europe 2020 Strategy, initiated in March
2020, abandoned the narrow focus on growth and jobs
and instead presented a wider set of targets which con‐
centrate on generating competitiveness through innova‐
tion, making growth sustainable and achieving higher
levels of social cohesion. The Commission proposed a
more stringent set of targets which would be imple‐
mented on the basis of a new annual coordinative pol‐
icy cycle (European Commission, 2010, p. 9). The result‐
ing European Semester is described by the Commission
as “a strong governance framework that harnesses the
instruments at its disposal to ensure timely and effective
implementation” (European Commission, 2010, p. 25)
which enables the mutual discussion of national macroe‐
conomic and budgetary reform plans. In terms of pro‐
cedure the European Semester policy cycle is initiated
by the discussion of the draft national budgets of the
eurozonemember states with the European Commission
and by the publication of six analytical documents by
the Commission:
1. The Annual Growth Survey, which determines the
main challenges facing the EU collectively in terms
of budgetary and macroeconomic development.
2. The Alert Mechanism Report focusing on existing
and potential macroeconomic imbalances in the
member states.
3. The Joint Employment Report, which summarizes
the achievements and ongoing challenges for
member states in this area.
4. The Euro Area Recommendation on specific
reform proposals for the euro area made in coop‐
eration with the Council.
5. The Single Market Report which is based on an
economic forecast conducted by the European
Commission four times a year (spring, summer,
autumn, and winter).
6. The Opinions on the National Reform Plans (NRPs)
issued by the member state governments.
In November each year national governments are
required to submit national budgetary convergence
and macroeconomic reform plans which are subse‐
quently discussed in the Council on the basis of the
draft country‐specific recommendations issued by the
European Commission. The final country‐specific rec‐
ommendations emerge on the basis of the interac‐
tion between the Commission guidelines and a col‐
lective adoption of the member states in the Council.
Implementation of these recommendation subsequently
depends on the domestic policy process. Monitoring
by the Commission is more extensive if a country
displays significant budgetary and/or macroeconomic
imbalances and is particularly stringent for the countries
of the euro area (European Parliament, 2020, p. 4).
In effect the European Semester consequently repre‐
sents a process which predominantly focuses on inter‐
governmental bargaining between member state gov‐
ernments individually and collectively in the EU Council
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and with the European Commission. The European par‐
liament plays a subordinate role in this process and
according to its own assessment is mainly involved in the
European Semester “through economic dialogue”:
In the context of the dialogue, Parliament may invite
the Presidents of the Council, the Commission, the
European Council or the Eurogroup, to discuss doc‐
uments and procedures relating to the European
Semester. In addition, in the specific case where a
Member State is subject to recommendations under
the preventive and/or the corrective arm of the
Stability Pact and the macroeconomic imbalance pro‐
cedure, Parliament may invite a national representa‐
tive from thatMember State for an exchange of views.
(European Parliament, 2019, p. 5)
The lack of European Parliament scrutiny of the pro‐
cess explains the need to focus on national parliaments
as potential agents of establishing input, throughput,
and ultimately also more effective output legitimacy.
National parliaments are the natural focus of domestic
constituents and hence offer the most promising strat‐
egy to “deepen the EU’s procedural integrity in a way
that will also strengthen its existential integrity” (Lacey
& Nicolaidis, 2020, p. 384).
4. Poland Under the European Semester
In 2015 Poland witnessed a profound change from the
centre‐right pro‐European Civic Platform government
under PrimeMinisters Donald Tusk (2011–2014) and Ewa
Kopacz (2014–2015) towards the right‐wing populist and
Eurosceptic Law and Justice (PiS) government of Andrzej
Dunda. Under changing prime ministers, PiS has since
cemented its leading role in Polish politics, always under
the strong influence of Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who has been
leader of PiS since 2003 and also served as Polish prime
minister between 2006 and 2007. He is currently also
deputy prime minister under Mateusz Morawiecki, who
took over as prime minister from Beate Szydlo in 2017.
PiS has shown a tendency to expand the powers of execu‐
tive government at the expense of legislative and judicial
powers. Against this background of democratic backslid‐
ing (Przybylski, 2018) it is important to examine to what
extent individual areas of EU‐level policy‐making have
been affected by the weakening of democratic mecha‐
nisms on the domestic level.
In the first available documents for Poland in the
European Semester process in 2013 the main emphasis
of the National Reform Programmewas on rectifying the
slump in economic growth to just above 1%, continuing
the downward trend in unemployment, which was just
starting to fall again after it had slightly risen from 7%
in 2008 to just over 10% in 2013. Moreover, the focus
of Poland lay on reducing the significant percentage of
peoplewhowere at the risk of poverty—25.8% (Republic
of Poland, 2013). The final Council recommendations on
the Polish convergence programme highlighted the need
for Poland to improve business conditions, particularly
in the area of research and development and to ensure
greater participation of young people and women in the
labour market (European Council, 2013).
Poland has not received any notification of macroe‐
conomic imbalances since 2013 (European Parliament,
2020, p. 12). At the same time Poland’s record of imple‐
menting the country specific recommendations issued
by the European Commission and the Council is rel‐
atively poor. Between 2013 and 2018 Poland imple‐
mented on average only around 20% of the recom‐
mendations. It consequently remains at the bottom
of the country‐specific recommendation implementa‐
tion score in the EU (Bénassy‐Quéré & Wolff, 2020,
p. 17). In Poland, the governmental consultations with
economic, scientific, and civil society stakeholders are
framed by their involvement “in the process of updat‐
ing the NRP and implementing the European Semester”
(Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 87). Parliamentary involve‐
ment usually takes place in the form of a parliamentary
hearing at Committee Stage in the lower house Sejm,
which involves representatives from relevant ministries
and also members of the European Parliament and sub‐
sequently a further hearing on the recommendations
published by the Commission.
The European Semester cycle in Poland during the
past five years has been characterised by a similar set
of recommendation issued by the Commission and the
Council, which essentially concentrated on the follow‐
ing areas:
• Fiscal consolidation and management.
• Pension reform (2015−2016 and again since 2019).
• Labour market reform to reduce segmentation,
increase participation (especially of young people
and women) and to adopt strategies to implement
lifelong learning.
• Facilitate investment in infrastructure, especially
energy, transport, and construction.
• Strengthen the innovation of the economy (since
2018) and countering the effects of the Covid pan‐
demic (2020).
At the discussion with the EU Affairs, the Public Finance
and the Economic Committee on the 2015 annual
National Reform and Convergence Plans in the Sjem on
23April 2015, the government emphasised that the num‐
ber of recommendations put forward by the European
Commission in their annual country report at the initial
stage of the Semester cycle in February has declined and
that they have also become less detailed. At the same
time the government advised the parliamentary commit‐
tees that legislative input is possible but will ultimately
depend on the collective approval by the EU Council:
“It is possible to change the wording of the recommen‐
dation without the approval of the Commission only if
such a change is in favour of a majority of the members
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of the Council of the European Union” (Chancellery of
the Sejm, 2015, p. 5). The discussions during the plenary
hearing concentrated on the proposals of the European
Commission to establish an independent Fiscal Council
in Poland to propose and monitor measures to maintain
the overall debt levels of Poland, which stood at just
below 50% in 2014, within the 60% threshold of stabil‐
ity and growth pact (European Commission, 2015, p. 13).
The background to this was Poland’s ability to enter
the eurozone, an issue which the Civic Platform admin‐
istration of Prime Minister Donald Tusk (2007−2014)
had emphasised as a crucial ambition for Poland to
join the core of the European Union (Schweiger, 2014b,
pp. 12–13). The members of Parliament (MPs) who took
part in the public hearing expressed diverging opin‐
ions about the establishment of an independent Fiscal
Council, which could eventually hold the powers to ini‐
tiate widespread change to fiscal policies, such as pen‐
sions. Jerzy Żyżyński, MP for the Eurosceptic PiS, which
subsequently won the 2015 national elections with the
largest share of mandates, raised the general question
why the European Commission proposed the establish‐
ment of an unelected body. He considered this proposal
to be at risk of jeopardising the right of the Sejm to exer‐
cise its budgetary powers:
This is some artificial creation, the functioning of
which is currently difficult to imagine. It is for the
Sejm to pass the budget. Who would advise this?
After all, the government formulates the draft bud‐
get, the Sejmdebates on it later and it is the Sejm that
actually passes the budget with some amendments.
(Chancellery of the Sejm, 2015, p. 8)
In the 2015 update to the Semester Convergence Plan,
submitted by the Polish government, the emphasis lay
on maintaining the government commitment towards
keeping the threshold of structural public debt in rela‐
tion to the GDP to a maximum of 55% of public debt.
The Fiscal Council is mentioned but the government
expresses no intention to pursue this proposal further.
Instead, government representatives point out that the
Supreme Audit Office annually submits an assessment of
the implementation of the national budget and on mon‐
etary policy to parliament, echoing the doubts of opposi‐
tionMPs about the establishment of a separate indepen‐
dent body (Council of Ministers, 2015, pp. 9, 64).
Since the election of the second PiS administration
in November 2016 the Annual Semester cycle has for‐
mally received the same level of parliamentary scrutiny
as in previous rounds under the Civic Platform govern‐
ments. Nevertheless, if one examines the extent of par‐
liamentary scrutiny, it becomes obvious that the govern‐
ment is trying to push through its agenda without sub‐
stantial input from MPs. This within the existing proce‐
dural rules under the 2011 Cooperation Act and mainly
through the executive powers of the Sejm. Under the
Cooperation Act, which determines relations between
the Polish government and parliament, Sejm’s European
Union Affairs Committee (SUE), which consists of up to
46 members, has the duty to ensure that parliamentary
oversight of developing and implementing EU law takes
in relation to Poland takes place. The Council ofMinisters
therefore has the duty to make all related documenta‐
tion available, including on “evaluations of annual leg‐
islative programmes of the European Commission drawn
up by the European Parliament and by the Council”;
usually these are submitted directly by the European
Commission to the Sejm (Chancellery of the Sejm, 2021).
The opinion of the EU Affairs Committee must be heard
by representatives of the Council of Ministers in public
parliamentary hearings on EU affairs and this should in
practice be an integral part of the national preference
formation which constitutes the first domestic level of
the two‐level game of EU policy‐making according to the
liberal intergovernmentalist perspective. The Council of
Ministers is required to explain if it fails to take into
account the opinion of the SUE in determining the offi‐
cial government position on the second level of suprana‐
tional intergovernmental bargaining in the EU between
member state governments with involvement of the
Commission and other EU bodies (Chancellery of the
Sejm, 2010, Articles 11–13). Closer examination of parlia‐
mentary hearing procedures reveals that since the 2016
parliament the powerful role of the speaker of the Sejm
has been used by the right‐wing Eurosceptic PiS adminis‐
tration to accelerate parliamentary hearings of govern‐
ment ministers by the SUE. As Maatsch shows in her
analysis, the combination of speeding up legislative ses‐
sions, scheduling them at inconvenient times (such as
late evenings), limiting the influence of stakeholders by
decreasing the number of public hearings amount to
“breaches of procedural correctness in the law‐making
process” which have become a common feature under
the PiS government (2021, p. 17). During the parliamen‐
tary period 2014–2019, the number of total legislative
sessions of the Sejm not only decreased from 102 to 86
when compared to the previous 2011–2015 parliamen‐
tary term; the most noticeable decrease is obvious in
the number of occasions where MPs where able to hold
the government to account by questioning ministers and
given oral statements. The former decreased from 975
to 835 and the latter from 3552 to only 1806, which rep‐
resents a significant deterioration in the level of parlia‐
mentary scrutiny. The PiS administration in Poland con‐
sequently pursues the ‘rationalization’ of policy‐making
through “attempts to strengthen or emancipate the posi‐
tion of the executive in law‐making” by stretching exist‐
ing parliamentary rules rather than to introduce insti‐
tutional changes, which is one way right‐wing populist
parties expand executive powers at the expensive of
the legislature, as is shown by studies in the Czech
Republic (Zbiral, 2021, p. 6). In contrast, the case of
Hungary shows a more direct disempowerment of par‐
liament through constitutional changes which have lim‐
ited the legislative and scrutiny powers of the Hungarian
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 124–134 129
parliament towards the executive under the right‐wing
populist Fidesz majority government since 2012 (Ilonszki
& Vajda, in press).
In the public hearing on the NRP in the Sejm on
13 April 2016 the government representative Jadwiga
Emilewicz, Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of
Development, emphasised the government’s agreement
with the assessment of the Polish situation presented
by the European Commission in the country report
published on 24 February 2016 (European Commission,
2016). At the same time, she pointed out the need
for parliament to swiftly approve the reform plan:
“The document will soon be submitted to the European
Commission, therefore it is important that that today
it will be widely accepted not only by the government
but also by the parliament” (Chancellery of the Sejm,
2016, p. 4). During the hearing, a number of opposition
MPs from the Civic Platform openly expressed their con‐
cern and discontent with the way answers they were try‐
ing to submit on the NRP were ignored by the govern‐
ment.MP JoannaMucha voiced her dissatisfaction about
the fact that the government representatives refused to
answer questions from the MPs directly:
Madam President, it has never happened in our time
that you would not be able to your ability to obtain
information from the government. This is what the
Sejm is for to perform a control function over govern‐
ment. Asmembers, we have a duty, not only the right,
to ask questions and receive answers. I am asking
you to give me the floor, because you saw that I was
reporting several times during the Minister’s speech.
(Chancellery of the Sejm, 2016, p. 12)
In the NRP published on 26 April 2016, the government
emphasised that besides parliamentary scrutiny the pro‐
cess of preparing the report involved “a broad spectre
of stakeholders from economic, scientific and civic soci‐
ety circles to participate in the work on drafting, imple‐
mentation and monitoring of the NRP” (The Republic
of Poland, 2016, p. 60). The consultation process is
guided by an inter‐ministerial team coordinated by the
Economics Ministry. The emphasis in the Polish consul‐
tation process on the Annual Semester cycle since 2016
lies on this direct interaction between the government
level and stakeholders, which includes regional author‐
ities, employers’ associations, trade unions, chambers
of commerce and agriculture, NGOs, and research bod‐
ies. These consultation forums which run under the logo
“Team for Europe” take place quarterly and therefore
provide a constant input into the drafting of the NRPs
and the monitoring of the implementation of the Annual
Semester recommendations in Poland.
From the liberal intergovernmentalist perspective
the PiS government has been pursuing a stakeholder‐
orientated approach in the European Semester consul‐
tations at the expense of parliamentary scrutiny. As PiS
has been governing the country on the basis of a major‐
ity in the Sejm since 2015 and also held the majority in
the Senate until 2019, it could afford to neglect legisla‐
tive scrutiny of the European Semester by the opposition
parties. Instead, the focus has been on integrating stake‐
holders into the cycle through the “Team for Europe”
approach. This confirms the observations made in stud‐
ies on the domestic scrutiny of the European Semester
process in other countries which have highlighted the
fact that:
1. The acceptance or the contestation of reform pro‐
posals depends firstly on the economic agenda of
governing and opposition parties.
2. Scrutiny of EU level policy guidance is more effec‐
tive if pursued in plenary sessions rather than in
committee hearings.
3. Governing parties prioritise their own domes‐
tic economic interests over effective scrutiny
and compliance with external policy guidance.
(Maatsch, 2017, p. 15)
The focus on other actors in the consultative process on
the European Semester in Poland is hence not surprising,
particularly given the low levels of institutionalisation of
parties in East‐Central Europe, shown in the lack of social
embeddedness, high volatility, and problems with being
considered as legitimate bodies to represent the public
interest (Kriesi, 2014, p. 373). The limited parliamentary
input in the European Semester process in Poland, par‐
ticularly at the crucial stage of establishing the priorities
of the national reform agenda, is not only reflected in
the lower level of formal consultations than it is the case
in the quarterly “Team Europe” consultations. It is also
shown in the fact that the current PiS government has
been clearly unwilling to adopt suggestions from opposi‐
tion MPs. An example for this was the rejection to follow
demands from opposition Civic Platform MPs to imple‐
ment an independent Fiscal Council in Poland, which had
been recommended by the European Commission and
the Council. Although Poland currently remains the only
EU member state without an independent Fiscal Council
which oversees fiscal policy (European Parliament, 2019),
at the hearing on 21April 2017 the government represen‐
tative Undersecretary of State in the Ministry of Finance
Leszek Skiba firmly rejected the call of oppositionMPs to
follow the EU guidance in this respect:
Yes, there really is some belief that public finances
could be more stable, if there was a Fiscal Council.
This assumption seems unjustified. Actually, it is
worth taking care of stable public finances, but this is
not necessarily the right instrument for this purpose.
(Chancellery of the Sejm, 2017, p. 4)
During parliamentary scrutiny of the NRP the follow‐
ing year the focus shifted towards criticism from gov‐
ernment MPs towards the EU’s alleged of focus on
the national Polish priorities for economic reform,
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particularly in the social area. PiS MP Gabriela
Maslowska asked the government to be cautious:
About simply making recommendations which treat
the EU as if it pursues our own goals….I believe that
we should be very careful and critical about these
matters and prudence to make our economic and
social development a priority for us. (Chancellery of
the Sejm, 2018, pp. 12–13)
Aneta Piątkowska (Deputy Director of the Government
Department of Innovation at the Ministry of
Entrepreneurship and Technology) responded: “Another
thing I want to point out, the recommendations—how
can we translate—are yes really recommendations. It is
still not a sure obligation to introduce and this is how
it should be perceived” (Chancellery of the Sejm, 2018,
p. 13). Under the PiS, government parliamentary scrutiny
has hence shifted towards amore general criticism of the
Annual Semester process itself, rather than on the devel‐
opment of a reform agenda in response to the annual
Commission country report issued at the beginning of
the year. The growing lack of commitment to the process
was also echoed in the to this date final parliamentary
hearing on a Polish Annual Semester NRPs in 2019.
The hearing on the Polish NRP 2019 in the Sejm on
11 April 2019 was dominated by a dispute between PiS
and opposition MPs on the lack of accuracy and detail
on the figures presented in the draft NRPs. The govern‐
ment, represented in this case by the Undersecretary of
State in the Finance Ministry, Leszek Skiba, responded
to these criticisms by admitting that it considered the
purpose of the parliamentary hearing to not present the
final recommendations of the NRPs but instead “gen‐
eral information about certain intentions, without pre‐
judging the nature of the very details” (Chancellery of
the Sejm, 2019, p. 15). The 2020 Annual Semester pro‐
cess in Poland took place without any parliamentary
scrutiny. The government explains this as follows: “Due
to extraordinary circumstances related to the COVID‐19
crisis, neither the Sejm, nor the Senate could be involved
in the discussions on the preparation of the National
Reform Programme” (Republic of Poland, 2020, p. 87).
The question remains if the government will use the cri‐
sis to attempt to shift the process further away from
legislative scrutiny towards direct consultations with rel‐
evant stakeholders. It has certainly declared its inten‐
tion to re‐evaluate how the European Semester pro‐
cess is conducted in Poland. This review takes place
exclusively on the executive level through the intermin‐
isterial committee and with a strong focus on “improv‐
ing the involvement of social partners in the process
of the European Semester” (Republic of Poland, 2020,
p. 87). In its recommendations for the Polish govern‐
ment under the 2020 European Semester policy cycle,
the European Council did not specifically address the
lack of legislative scrutiny in the determination of the
Polish reform agenda. The Council nevertheless empha‐
sised that the Polish government should “ensure effec‐
tive public consultations and involvement of social part‐
ners in the policy‐making process,” thereby highlight‐
ing that the process of determining Poland’s European
Semester NRP targets remains to focused on top‐down
decision‐making by government executives (European
Council, 2020, para. 30(4)).
5. Conclusion: Evaluating the Polish Experience with
the European Semester
The analysis of the involvement of parliamentary input
in Poland illustrates the general problem of the pro‐
cess, which is heavily tilted towards executive bargain‐
ing processes between national governments and the
European Commission, both on an individual bilateral
level and collectively in the Council. The Polish case
shows that the danger that the process could result
in “a formal and complex game whereby governments
decide the policy, the EU formulates the country‐specific
recommendations and governments have to implement
them” is indeed a realistic one (Alcidi & Gros, 2017,
p. 26). Although the Polish government includes a wide
range of stakeholders through the “Team Europe” con‐
sultations, the level of parliamentary scrutiny remains
weak. Formally it mainly takes place at committee stage.
In terms of real input, the process lacks depth and more
extensive mechanisms for individual MPs to get involved.
Overall, this reflects the fundamental problem with the
European Semester, which lies in the fact that from the
two‐level perspective the process is orientated towards
bargaining on the second level, i.e., the supranational
level between national governments and EU institutions,
most of all the European Commission and the Council.
The result has been that national governments shift their
attention increasingly towards the supranational level,
with less time and effort spent on domestic consulta‐
tions and scrutiny (Crum, 2017, p. 274). At the same
time national parliaments have shied away from disrupt‐
ing the EU‐level bargaining process with wide‐ranging
demands for scrutiny and policy changes (Fasone, 2014).
Although the variety of parliamentary scrutiny of the dif‐
ferent aspects of the European Semester varies consider‐
ably amongst EU member states—particularly between
countries inside and outside of the eurozone (Hallerberg,
2017)—the Polish example not only exposes the funda‐
mental problems of the process: constraining the abil‐
ity of national governments to consider domestic legis‐
latures and failing to compensate this on the EU level by
also limiting the influence of the European Parliament to
a purely consultative role. It also shows that particularly
populist Eurosceptic governments tend to adapt exist‐
ing parliamentary practices without necessarily amend‐
ing them to limit legislative scrutiny in the context of
the increasingly complex multi‐level governance system
of the EU. The Polish example consequently is in line
with the general trend of the Europe 2020 Strategy
which shows that it lacks efficient mechanisms to ensure
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 124–134 131
parliamentary input and throughput legitimacy, both on
the supranational European Parliament level as on the
crucial domestic level of parliamentary scrutiny. While
this may not necessarily result in a lack of efficient pol‐
icy output in the process of aspiring to achieve the over‐
all Europe 2020 targets, the lack of parliamentary input
and throughput scrutiny mechanisms pose a substantial
risk for the level of public ownership of the European
Semester policy process. This needs to be considered
under the successor strategy of Europe 2020, which is
most likely to lead towards the revision of existing pol‐
icy practices, which will have the task of “ensuring a
more citizen‐driven and more decentralised democratic
systemwhile using the advantages of fair economic coop‐
eration at a global level” (King, 2017, Slide No. 13).
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